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Abstract:
In this article we propose a new framework for investigating how 
accurately and by what process people read others’ minds – a process 
that requires perceivers to make a retrodictive inference. In this context, 
we discuss the value of a novel methodological approach that 
complements the conceptual framework. This framework is formulated 
on the basis of a series of empirical articles emerging over the past few 
years in which the ideas appear in nascent form. Retrodiction is the 
process in which, on observing a person’s behavior (often but not 
exclusively a facial expression), people are equipped not only to sense 
the underlying inner state but also to infer the event that caused that 
inner state. Indeed, the goal of mindreading need not always be to 
identify an inner state explicitly but to infer the event that caused the 
inner state. Doing so is adaptive in that it permits access to a more 
expansive view of the world through the lens of another mind. This view 
of mindreading naturally leads to a reconsideration of methods that are 
fit for purpose and leads to testable hypotheses.
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Interpreting signals in behaviour 2
Abstract
In this article we propose a new framework for investigating how accurately and by 
what process people read others’ minds – a process that requires perceivers to make a 
retrodictive inference. In this context, we discuss the value of a novel methodological 
approach that complements the conceptual framework. This framework is formulated 
on the basis of a series of empirical articles emerging over the past few years in which 
the ideas appear in nascent form. Retrodiction is the process in which, on observing a 
person’s behavior (often but not exclusively a facial expression), people are equipped 
not only to sense the underlying inner state but also to infer the event that caused that 
inner state. Indeed, the goal of mindreading need not always be to identify an inner 
state explicitly but to infer the event that caused the inner state. Doing so is adaptive 
in that it permits access to a more expansive view of the world through the lens of 
another mind. This view of mindreading naturally leads to a reconsideration of 
methods that are fit for purpose and leads to testable hypotheses.
Key words: mindreading; retrodiction; cognitive development; social cognition; 
spontaneous behavior; truth condition; response bias; individual differences
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Interpreting signals in behaviour 3
Interpreting signals in other people’s behavior to sense 
things about them and to infer things about their world 
1. Introduction
Interpreting information signaled in another person’s behavior to understand what 
they think and how they feel, is one of the central aspects of human social cognition. 
This kind of mindreading is known as retrodiction and refers to the perceiver (a 
person observing another person’s behavior) tracking backwards from the target’s (the 
person being observed by the perceiver) behavior to determine the mental state 
experienced by the target (Gallese & Goldman, 1998). The goal of this article is to 
articulate a framework for understanding retrodiction and we shall examine a method 
that is suited to investigating the underlying process. We shall go on to consider the 
value of mindreading as an adaptive process that furnishes the mindreader with 
knowledge of the world that they might not otherwise have known.
2. The concept of retrodiction 
Although the term was coined by Gallese and Goldman (1998), retrodiction has 
actually been investigated before that time by Bartsch and Wellman (1989) and by 
Robinson and Mitchell (1995). In tasks devised by these researchers, young children 
observed dioramas enacted with dolls in which a protagonist embarked on a futile 
search owing to his or her false belief. Children aged three and four years were 
expected to explain the protagonist’s behavior by referring to a proximal cause (the 
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Interpreting signals in behaviour 4
protagonist’s false belief, Bartsch & Wellman, 1989) or by referring to a more distal 
cause (the event that gave rise to false belief, Robinson & Mitchell, 1995). Defined 
this way, retrodiction refers to the process of identifying the cause of extant behavior, 
where, according to Teoh et al (2017), the cause can either be understood at a 
proximal level (an inner state, such as a state of false belief) or at a distal level (a 
worldly event that gave rise to the inner state, such as the coveted object moving from 
one place to the other in the protagonist’s absence).
Among the various practical benefits of retrodictive inference, one is using 
another mind as a lens onto aspects of the world that are not perceived directly. Such 
ability emerges very early in development in a basic form known as ‘social 
referencing’ (Sorce, Emde, Campos, & Klinnert, 1985). In real life, people usually 
have a wide range of information to draw upon in making a retrodictive inference, 
including the natural and spontaneous facial expression of the target along with other 
aspects of observable behavior coupled with contextual information. An expressive 
face can signal an emotional state (Zaki, Bolger, & Ochsner, 2008, 2009), a state that 
will likely be caused by events in the world (Cassidy, Ropar, Mitchell, & Chapman, 
2013, 2015; Kang, Anthoney, & Mitchell, 2017; Pillai, Sheppard, & Mitchell, 2012; 
Pillai et al., 2014; Sheppard et al., 2016; Teoh et al, 2017; Valanides, Sheppard, & 
Mitchell, 2017; Wu & Mitchell, 2019). Hence, retrodiction as an account of 
mindreading assumes that a person’s inner states are to some degree signaled in their 
behavior (e.g., see Gallagher, 2011, for a perspective on how behavior signals inner 
Page 4 of 37
Social and Personality Psychology Compass






























































Interpreting signals in behaviour 5
states), implying that a person (a perceiver) who is accurate in mindreading is one 
who is capable of interpreting such signals. Retrodictive inferences not only involve 
labelling the expression or indeed identifying the target’s inner state but also inferring 
the event (the distal cause) that caused the target’s inner state (the proximal cause) 
that in turn caused the behavior in the target that we currently observe (Teoh et al, 
2017). Retrodiction, we argue, is a form of (situational) attribution process, but it is a 
special kind of attribution that it involves inferring the cause of the event based on 
perceiving an observable behavioural reaction and via sensing the target’s inner state 
(rather than reasoning from other known facts). 
It is noteworthy that being able to retrodict – to make accurate interpretations of a 
target’s behavior -- requires understanding of at least two things: (1) Understanding 
something about the situation -- certain situations give rise to particular inner states in 
the target that lead to interpretable signals in the targ t’s behavior; (2) Understanding 
something about the person – different people emit different signals in relation to a 
given situation and hence there is no one-to-one mapping between signal and 
situation. To expand on the latter, the way people (targets) react to events is 
moderated by who they are, including their emotions, motives, intentions, attitudes, 
beliefs, knowledge and personality traits (Flavell, Miller & Miller, 1993). Hence, not 
all targets spontaneously react in the same way to a singular event and target 
expressions differ from one to another even when they are experiencing the same 
inner state. That is not to say the relationship between event, inner state and target 
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Interpreting signals in behaviour 6
expression is completely arbitrary; rather, most spontaneous target expressions will 
fall within a certain range or category for any given event and inner state. A perceiver 
who is good at making retrodictive inferences is thus sensitive to the range of 
reactions, quite often subtle, provoked by a singular event.
3. Methodological consideration in research of everyday mindreading--The three 
principles
A major challenge for research into social cognition is to understand how 
perceivers fare in real life when events are mercurial and unpredictable, when targets 
spontaneously react in subtle, unconstrained and occasionally unguarded ways. To 
understand how perceivers make accurate inferences in real life, we need to 
investigate how well they interpret subtle and spontaneous target behavior. In view of 
this, special considerations are required and we outline three principles to guide 
methodology: (1) the importance of asking perceivers to interpret the spontaneous 
behavior of targets, of the typically subtle kind they might encounter in real life; (2) 
satisfying the ‘truth condition’ – the researcher needs to find a way of objectively 
evaluating a perceiver’s interpretation of target behavior; (3) separating accuracy from 
bias in perceivers’ judgments. Each of these principles has been recognized in 
previous research but perhaps not in combination, although the principles have 
emerged in combination in recent research on retrodiction. They are abstracted and 
formulated here to guide future methodological decisions, with the assumption that a 
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Interpreting signals in behaviour 7
close relationship maintains between theoretical developments in this sphere and 
relevant methodological considerations.
3.1 The importance of asking perceivers to interpret spontaneous target behavior 
While some have championed the value of ecologically valid stimuli (Dziobek et 
al., 2006; Heavey et al., 2000; Zaki & Ochsner, 2011), much research on adults’ 
mindreading has not done so in false belief procedures (Back & Apperly, 2010; 
Coverse, Lin, Keysar & Epley, 2008; German & Hehman, 2006; Mitchell, Robinson, 
Isaacs & Nye, 1996), perspective taking tasks (Apperly et al., 2010; Epley, 
Morewedge & Keysar, 2004; Keysar, Barr, Balin & Brauner, 2000; Keysar, Lin & 
Barr, 2003), social animation tasks (Abell, Happé & Frith, 2000) and tasks of reading 
the mind in the eyes (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore & Robertson, 1997). These 
tasks usually require the participant to attribute a mental state to a hypothetical target 
(social agent) or a posed actor based on a fictitious situation, an abstract social 
animation or based on a static image in the absence of situational context (e.g., 
photographs of the eyes). 
Though these process-based tasks are helpful to probe the cognitive 
underpinnings of mindreading, they say rather less about how accurately participants 
routinely make everyday interpretations of other minds when observing subtle and 
spontaneous behaviour (Zaki & Ochsner, 2011). In the real world we often need to 
work with fleeting and sometimes unpredictable, rapidly changing stimuli to infer the 
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Interpreting signals in behaviour 8
cause of the behavior we observe. Making inferences from signals in target behavior 
is not like reading a novel because these kinds of signals vary from one target to 
another in reaction to a singular event (within situational limits); unlike natural 
language, there is no one-to-one correspondence between the signal to be decoded and 
the event it relates to (Archer & Akert, 1977; Birdwhistell, 1952, 1970).
3.2 Satisfying the truth condition
Understanding not just how but how accurately perceivers identify targets’ inner 
states, such as what they are thinking or how they feel, is an important question if we 
assume that the goal of such processing is to understand the social and the physical 
world in guiding social behavior (Zaki & Ochsner, 2011). According to West and 
Kenny (2011), the truth condition, thought to be the most essential but elusive 
component in social perception research, refers to an objective benchmark against 
which a perceiver’s accuracy in interpersonal inferences can be measured. For 
example, if the perceiver declared that the target is thinking X, how can we verify 
independently of the perceiver’s judgment that the target really is thinking X? 
Traditional research in a false belief framework achieves this objective by formally 
defining the mental state of a hypothetical protagonist and then observing whether or 
not the participant infers that state. But given that we are interested in knowing how 
accurately perceivers interpret spontaneous target behavior of the subtle kind that 
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Interpreting signals in behaviour 9
prevails in real life, that is amenable to retrodictive inference, satisfying the truth 
condition presents a challenge. 
Would it be a good solution to investigate if a perceiver’s inference of the target’s 
inner state matches what the target declares as their inner state? This promising 
approach seeks to investigate ‘empathic accuracy’, the ability of one person to read 
another’s mind while the pair are engaged in conversation (e.g., Ickes, Stinson, 
Bissonnette, & Garcia, 1990; Ickes, 2003, 2009). After the conversation, the two 
participants watch videos of themselves and write down what they were thinking at 
any given moment. Subsequently, the participants view videos of their conversational 
partner and guess what they had been thinking. Judges then compare what targets 
declared they were thinking with estimations made by perceivers of what the targets 
were thinking. If there was a fair level of correspondence, the researchers concluded 
that these conversation partners were to some extent able to read each other’s minds. 
Moreover, one might argue that the truth condition has been satisfied in that we can 
compare the perceiver’s judgment with an ‘objective fact’ – which is defined as 
whatever the target declared they were thinking.
On reflection, though, this approach might not offer an ideal solution to the 
problem. The trouble with this task is that it seems to assume that the target’s 
declaration of their mental state is a reliable and valid source of information. Such an 
assumption would only be appropriate if it were the case that (1) the target’s mind is 
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Interpreting signals in behaviour 10
transparent to itself – in other words, the target can know what is in their own mind 
through a process of introspection; (2) the target is sufficiently articulate to be able to 
translate their inner states into a verbal description and/or adequate vocabulary exists 
to describe the exact state(s) in question; (3) the target elects to be honest in reporting 
their inner states. We cannot be sure about any of these three conditions – for 
example, individuals with alexithymia usually have difficulties verbally describing 
their own emotions (Grynberg et al., 2012). Hence, there are no grounds for asserting 
that the truth condition has been satisfied.1 For this reason, it is useful instead to ask 
perceivers to retrodict the event that happened in the world that caused the target’s 
inner state that in turn caused their observable behavior. In this case the truth 
condition is definitely satisfied because we can verify independently whether or not 
the external event really and truly did happen, though sometimes (but not always, as 
explained below) we have to sacrifice asking the perceiver explicitly and directly 
about the target’s inner state. 
3.3 Separating accuracy from bias in the process of mindreading  
Fodor (1992) suggests that children’s difficulty acknowledging false belief is the 
product of bias to report their knowledge of the current state of reality. Mitchell et al 
(1996) also identified such bias in adults’ judgments of others’ belief states, drawing a 
parallel with hindsight bias (Fischhoff, 1975) -- and converging evidence was 
reported by Birch and Bloom (2007). Such bias can occur from underdeveloped or 
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Interpreting signals in behaviour 11
dysfunctional processes in executive capacities, perhaps preventing the participant 
inhibiting a prepotent but inappropriate response (Russell, Mauthner, Sharpe, & 
Tidswell, 1991). Indeed, according to Leslie and Thaiss (1992), bias affecting 
response selection gives the misleading impression that young children are rather less 
capable in perceiving others’ mental states than is really the case.
When participants are interpreting the behavior of a target, particularly a 
spontaneous facial expression, they might be biased to interpret the expression 
negatively (e.g. ‘sad’) especially if the expression is subtle, as many spontaneous ones 
are (Kang et al, 2017). According to West and Kenny (2011) it is desirable to identify 
and isolate bias in order to gain a more accurate impression of ability in mindreading. 
They define bias as ‘any systematic factor that judgments are being attracted toward, 
besides the truth’ (p360). Research would benefit if it were possible to devise a 
procedure that allows us to investigate the part of performance that is not affected by 
processing bias (or at least response bias). This follows in the sense that models of 
ability presume to be founded on data that reveal competence; performance errors, 
including systematic errors arising from response bias, threaten to mask evidence 
pertaining to underlying competence.
A widely used procedure in experimental psychology, including research into 
social cognition, and specifically retrodiction, requires participants to make multiway 
forced choices, and their responses thus qualify as the dependent variable. If 
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Interpreting signals in behaviour 12
participants are biased to make one kind of response in preference to another, then it 
is possible that this bias is not a consequence of deficiency in the capacity being 
investigated but rather is a nuisance variable that masks underlying ability. Useful 
procedures for isolating variance in the data associated with response selection bias 
are signal detection (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005) and Wagner’s unbiased hit rate 
(Wagner, 1993), procedures which compare 'hits’ (making a given response when it is 
correct to do so) with ‘false alarms’ (making a given response when it is incorrect to 
do so). Measuring and taking account of false alarms effectively makes adjustments 
of response base rates, giving rise to a measure that reflects performance after 
response bias has been partialled out. This principle is highly relevant to research on 
retrodiction (e.g., Pillai et al., 2012; Teoh et al., 2017; Wu & Mitchell, 2019), as 
perceivers were asked to select an answer from an array of alternatives in many of the 
published studies.
4. The framework of retrodiction 
The framework of retrodiction posits, perhaps controversially, that perceivers 
capably interpret behavior with consideration of the target’s inner state (Bartsch & 
Wellman, 1989; Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Robinson & Mitchell, 1995) as a 
preliminary step to inferring the worldly event that caused the target’s inner state 
(Teoh et al, 2017). The process is illustrated in Figure 1.
                       Figure 1a, 1b, & 1c about here
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Interpreting signals in behaviour 13
The perceiver, appearing on the left in Figure 1a, observes the expression of the 
target who is reacting to something that happened in the world, an event that the 
perceiver can only know by successfully interpreting the target’s expression. In this 
case, the event that happened in the world was the experimenter making a personal 
call to her boyfriend to discuss dinner (Alkhaldi et al, 2019; Pillai et al, 2012, 2014; 
Sheppard et al, 2016). While the experimenter was apparently enjoying a scintillating 
conversation, we might assume the target was irritated and waiting frustratedly to 
commence the task he had signed up to do. Here, the target’s frustration and irritation 
is signaled in his expression and it seems this expression is readable to the perceiver 
in as far as the perceiver is able to infer the event in the world that caused the target’s 
expression. Hence, the expression has a proximal cause, which is the inner state being 
experienced by the target, and this in turn is linked with a distal cause – the event in 
the world. In the figure, we depict the perceiver’s apprehension of the proximal cause 
– the target’s mental state -- as an image of the brain and in this particular case the 
target’s mental state is one of irritation which is represented by the emoticon. We 
hypothesize that if the target has inferred the distal cause, then they must also have 
some sense of the proximal cause (the target’s mental state).  
4.1 Alternative hypothesis and explanations 
An alternative possibility, though, is that perceivers sense the target’s inner state 
and the event that caused their behavior in parallel (as illustrated in Figure 1b), not in 
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Interpreting signals in behaviour 14
sequence. If so, then inferring the event in the world that caused the target’s behavior 
is not dependent upon sensing the target’s inner state in a preliminary step. In 
principle, this model supposes that the perceiver could infer what caused the target’s 
behavior in the absence of sensing the target’s inner state, and if so, then the 
perceiver’s success in retrodictively inferring the external event that caused the 
target’s behavior would not be informative about the perceiver’s ability to sense the 
target’s inner states. A more extreme possibility (Figure 1c) supposes that perceivers 
are behaviorists and do not have any sense of the target’s inner state; rather, they only 
make an inference from the signal in the target’s behavior directly to the event in the 
world that caused the target’s behavior.
The models schematized in Figure 1b and Figure 1c are united in implying that 
perceivers effectively read off an event in the world from the target’s behavior 
(without needing to consider the target’s mind). We can never rule out the possibility 
that perceivers make apparent mentalizing judgments by associating behavior with 
events that occur in the world (Heyes, 2014). Ultimately, one might argue that a 
purpose of making inferences from signals in others’ behavior is to know something 
about the world that we would not or could not have known if we lived in a social 
vacuum and had to rely only on direct experience instead. If perceivers can make such 
inferences with a degree of accuracy in a context that honors the three principles listed 
above, then perhaps this in itself should be celebrated, even if sensing inner states 
plays no part in the process. 
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Interpreting signals in behaviour 15
Notwithstanding, let us suppose that perceivers do indeed sense that the target has 
an inner state as a processing step towards inferring the distal cause – the worldly 
event that provoked the target’s reaction. As a thought experiment, imagine that two 
perceivers, who accurately inferred that the target was in the presence of an 
experimenter who was rudely using her mobile phone, each articulated what they 
sensed to be the target’s inner state: one sensed that he felt irritated and one sensed 
that he felt bored. Does this imply that one of them must be wrong? If so does it imply 
that a perceiver need not sense the target’s inner state accurately to make an accurate 
inference of the distal worldly event that provoked the target’s reaction? Surely this 
would imply that being able to sense the target’s inner state is not a necessary 
processing step for the perceiver in accurately inferring the distal cause of the target’s 
behavior, effectively suggesting that what is depicted in Figure 1a is wrong.
However, we propose that what is depicted in Figure 1a remains the most 
compelling process account, even though data tell us that different perceivers 
sometimes do actually impute different inner states on viewing the same target 
behavior. Sheppard et al (2016) asked perceivers to freely describe a particular 
instance of target behavior (in the absence of any constraint associated with 
forced-choice responding) and a multitude of labels emerged, indeed including a 
variety of inner state terms. But this need not imply that perceivers entertain a loose 
mapping between the proximal (the particular target inner state) and the distal (the 
worldly event); rather, it could and probably does imply a loose mapping in perceivers 
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Interpreting signals in behaviour 16
between what they sense the target is experiencing and the label they select to declare 
what they believe to be the target’s inner state. The key point here is that as suggested 
in Pillai et al (2012), we assume perceivers sense the target’s inner state as a kind of 
bodily resonance that gives rise to an echo of the target’s inner state, enabling the 
perceiver to share that inner state (Gallese, 2005) -- something Goldman and de 
Vignemont (2009) call ‘low-level mentalizing.’
In contrast, ‘high-level mentalizing’ in Goldman and de Vignemont’s (2005) 
taxonomy involves explicit propositional representations of the kind that can be 
verbalized. The cognitive elaboration to enable mapping from low-level to high-level 
mentalizing probably will depend on what aspect of bodily resonance the perceiver 
attends to (is it the aspect of irritation or the aspect of boredom?) coupled with their 
ability to attach labels to feelings. Pillai et al (2012) argued that such explicit 
elaboration does not illuminate the process of retrodiction and we reinforce that 
argument here. In short, then, when two perceivers explicitly impute different inner 
states to a target on viewing a singular sample of behavior, this remains perfectly 
compatible with the processing route sketched in Figure 1a. Moreover, the possibility 
that perceivers explicitly impute different inner states in relation to the same target 
behavior could well be a sign that explicit, high-level propositional mentalizing is not 
particularly relevant to retrodiction or indeed to a broad range of mindreading 
activities.
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Interpreting signals in behaviour 17
4.2 Is it possible to investigate retrodiction according to the three principles?
Reading other minds is something that happens in a social context, it is not 
something that happens in social isolation. If it did not happen in a social context, 
then there would not be a mind available to be read. Consequently, a priority is to 
understand how people interpret the kind of clues one might encounter in a social 
context, namely states of mind that are signaled in the subtle, fleeting and 
spontaneous behavior of a target (Zaki & Ochsner, 2011). It follows, therefore, that 
the aim should be to investigate how perceivers fare in processing such stimuli, as 
was done in Pillai et al (2012) and the articles that built on that research (Principle 1, 
use spontaneously generated stimuli).
When the perceiver senses that the target is experiencing state X, how can we 
know that the target is really and truly experiencing state X (West & Kenny, 2011)? 
Specifically, how can we know this independently of what the target says they are 
experiencing (because they may not know even if they have the illusion that they do 
know) and independently of any consensus view offered by panels of judges (because 
even if there is consensus, it does not follow they are right)? The answer we offer to 
this apparently insuperable problem is to ask perceivers not about the target’s inner 
state (the retrodictive proximal cause of the target’s behavior), but to infer the event 
that caused the target’s inner state (the retrodictive distal cause of the target’s 
behavior). The perceiver’s judgment can then be measured against an objective and 
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Interpreting signals in behaviour 18
independently verifiable fact: When the perceiver declares that the target’s reaction 
was caused by Event X, we (the experimenters) can determine whether or not Event X 
really and truly did occur (Principle 2, satisfy the truth condition).2
The price of satisfying the truth condition involves a tradeoff such that perceivers 
are not actually asked about the target’s inner state; instead, they are asked what 
caused the target’s behavior – an event that happened in the world. This procedure is 
not unique in researching understanding of inner states. Indeed, Wimmer and Perner 
(1983) took pains to devise a task in which children were deliberately not asked 
explicitly about the thoughts of a protagonist in case their lack of mental state 
vocabulary (Johnson & Maratsos, 1977; Johnson & Wellman, 1980) caused them to 
underperform, potentially giving the wrong impression that they lacked knowledge of 
inner states when in fact they merely lacked practical knowledge of mental state 
vocabulary. In their classic false belief task, Wimmer and Perner (1983) did not ask 
children explicitly where Maxi thought the chocolate was located but rather asked 
them to predict where Maxi would search. In so far as competent participants 
understand that behavior (including searching) is determined by inner states, they 
should judge that Maxi will search according to his belief and not according to the 
child participant’s own belief. By the same token, when participants explain the 
target’s behavior, we assume they do so by retrodictively considering the target’s 
mental state en route to inferring the event in the world that caused the target’s mental 
state (Robinson & Mitchell, 1995). 
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Interpreting signals in behaviour 19
However, the worldly event that caused the target’s inner state could actually be a 
cue-word, such as ‘grateful’ (i.e., ‘Think of a time you felt grateful’ – Valanides et al, 
2017; Wu & Mitchell, 2019). On observing a video of the target’s behavior, 
perceivers could be asked to infer the cue word that appeared before the target, or they 
could even be asked to infer what the target was thinking. We predict in this particular 
case (where a question about the worldly event and a question about the target’s inner 
state can be correctly answered with the same response) that their accuracy would be 
no different under these two conditions. Hence, this procedure can indeed be adapted 
to explicitly ask perceivers to make judgements of other’s inner states, even though in 
many cases of retrodiction, the target’s inner state is not identified explicitly by the 
perceiver.
When perceivers make errors in retrodiction or other forms of mindreading, what 
does this reveal about the status of their (lack of) ability? Does it tell us they lack the 
ability to read minds or does it tell us that even though they are capable of reading 
minds, pervasive bias in their response selection leads to errors, perhaps systematic 
errors that mask underlying competence (Mitchell et al., 1996)? In a task that meets 
the condition set out in Principle 2, above, bias could result in the perceiver defaulting 
to one response option over alternatives in a forced choice task of the kind used in 
retrodictive mindreading procedures. For example, imagine the perceiver’s task is to 
infer whether the target is looking at a negative or positive image (North, Todorov & 
Osherson, 2010, 2012). In many cases, the target reaction will be subtle, meaning that 
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Interpreting signals in behaviour 20
targets look somewhat neutral. Neutral expressions may be interpreted by perceivers 
as negative expressions (Kang et al, 2017), which could result in a preponderance of 
‘negative’ responses. This bias in perceiver judgments needs to be separated from 
aspects of performance which speak to perceivers’ competence or lack of competence 
(West and Kenny, 2011 – Principle 3, measure and take into account response bias). 
In the kind of example offered here, it is possible to measure and take into account 
response bias in the kind of forced choice task used in retrodiction research by using 
either signal detection for coding data (Pillai et al, 2012; Wu et al, 2016, 2017; Wu & 
Mitchell, 2019) or Wagner’s unbiased hit rate (Sheppard et al, 2016), as described 
above.
4.3 Sensing inner states – what is the evidence?
Retrodictive inference enables the perceiver to guess what happened to others 
from their reactions (Cassidy et al., 2013, 2015; Pillai et al., 2012, 2014; Sheppard et 
al., 2016), to know the emotion being expressed by a third party that the target 
accompanies (Kang et al, 2017), to infer what the target was thinking as demonstrated 
by accurate identification of a cue word presented to the target (Wu & Mitchell, 
2019). In the study conducted by Kang et al (2017), for example, targets observed a 
succession of faces posing expressions displayed on a computer screen. Videos of the 
targets as they viewed the expressions were subsequently shown to perceivers who 
were tasked with inferring which emotional expression the target was viewing at any 
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one time. Despite the very weak signal, perceivers were nevertheless surprisingly 
accurate in inferring which expression targets were viewing, even when those 
perceivers were as young as 7 years. Presumably, targets spontaneously and subtly 
imitated the expressions they were viewing, giving rise to a readable signal. 
The task described above involves a retrodictive inference concerning 
spontaneous behavior – the target spontaneously and subtly imitated the expression 
they were viewing (Principle 1) -- and it is one that satisfies the truth condition, for 
we know for a fact which expression the target was really and truly viewing at any 
given moment (Principle 2). Furthermore, the data could be coded using Wagner’s 
unbiased hit rate (or signal detection), which proved to be essential given that 
perceivers were biased to judge that targets were looking at a sad expression 
(Principle 3). 
Notwithstanding, accurate performance of the perceivers could be explained 
reductively and contrary to theory. The theory hypothesizes that accurate perceiver 
performance is a product of retrodiction that involves sensing the target’s mental 
reaction (their inner state) caused by what they can see (a facial expression) but a rival 
explanation reductively says that perceivers disregarded the instruction to infer which 
expression targets were looking at and instead merely classified and labelled the 
target’s expression, perhaps on the (correct) assumption that this cognitively simpler 
strategy would yield an equally accurate response. 
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The hypothesis derived from the theory of retrodiction is as follows: When asked 
which expression the target is viewing, perceivers first look for signals in the target’s 
behavior, enabling them to classify the target’s facial expression if possible, and then 
sense the mental reaction of the target (i.e. their inner state) followed by an inference 
of the expression being viewed by the target. The opposing hypothesis says that no 
inference is involved and that processing ceases upon the perceiver classifying the 
target’s expression. This hypothesis was duly tested by Kang et al (2018) in which 
perceivers wore EEG nets under two experimental conditions, one in which perceivers 
were asked which expression the target was viewing (the retrodiction question) and 
one in which perceivers were asked to classify the target’s expression (without 
reference to anything the targets might be viewing). The retrodiction hypothesis 
predicts that when perceivers answer the retrodiction question the cortical signal will 
sustain for a longer period (reflecting the additional mental operation involved) and 
will reveal activity in areas reputed to be involved in mindreading, compared with 
when they answer the classification question. The opposing hypothesis predicts 
identical cortical signatures (in duration and in location) when perceivers answer both 
questions. 
In support of the hypothesis, Kang et al (2018) found that when perceivers were  
answering the classification question this involved little more than processing the 
target’s expression, marked by activity in the fusiform face area (Kanwisher & Yovel, 
2006). In contrast, answering the retrodiction question gave rise to additional cortical 
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activity associated with processing inner states, particularly in the medial prefrontal 
cortex and in the left and right temporo-parietal junction (Schurz et al., 2014). 
Compared with answering the classification question, and considering the findings of 
Sabbagh et al (2004), EEG measurements revealed stronger slow-wave activity 
(N270-400) over the inferior frontal and anterior temporal regions of the right 
hemisphere. Hence, the evidence suggests retrodiction amounts to more than 
classification of a target’s facial expression.
5. Individual differences in readability
Past research into retrodiction has mostly focused on how accurately perceivers 
make judgments about targets, especially the stimuli or events they are reacting to. 
But because multiple perceivers make such judgments about each target, there is a 
mean score associated with each target representing the average level of accuracy 
achieved by a group of perceivers in relation to judgments of what caused that 
particular target’s reaction. This could be defined as a readability value for that target. 
Evidently, the prospects of accurate mindreading depend not only on the ability of the 
perceiver to carry out the appropriate processing but also on the quality of signal 
emanating from the target. The notion that some targets may have inner states that are 
more readable mirrors ideas in the Realistic Accuracy Model (Funder, 2012) which 
proposes that there are individual differences in target readability in relation to 
personality judgments.
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The procedure described above, that stratifies the three principles, offers an 
additional benefit in the sense that it lends itself to coding at the level of the target, to 
determine individual differences in target readability. We can thus place targets in 
rank order from most to least readable, with the expectation that some will be 
significantly readable, some will be unreadable and some will emit signals that are 
significantly misleading. Unreadable targets are those for whom perceivers are unable 
to make accurate inferences without there being any consensus on an incorrect 
inference. Misleading targets are not only unreadable but are systematically 
misleading to perceivers, who are liable to infer that targets are reacting to something 
other than they are actually reacting to. For example, in our pilot work, a particular 
target was videoed while reacting to the cue word ‘anger’ and yet perceivers tended to 
infer that he was viewing the cue word, ‘happy’ apparently due to his smiling 
expression (albeit, perhaps a devilish smile!).
Recent research shows that autistic targets tend to be very difficult to read by 
neurotypical perceivers (Alkhaldi et al, 2019; Sheppard et al, 2016). And targets who 
vary on the trait empathy continuum vary in how readable they are, depending upon 
what kind of thing they are thinking about (Wu & Mitchell, 2019). Collectively, these 
studies suggest an expressive target is not necessarily readable; the quality rather than 
the strength of the signal emanating from the target is critical. Hence, the link between 
readability and personality is complicated by the particular inner state the target is 
experiencing.
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6. Summary and conclusion
In this article we propose a framework for investigating how accurately and by 
what process people read others’ minds – a process that requires perceivers to make a 
retrodictive inference. In other words, after witnessing a target’s behavior, we assume 
the perceiver is sensitive to a proximal cause of target behaviour (the target’s inner 
state) which allows them to proceed to a distal inference (the event in the world that 
caused the target’s inner state). The perceiver is asked to infer the causal event in the 
world and if they can do this then we assume they have also sensed the target’s inner 
state.
This approach complies with the three principles outlined above. First, the 
behavior of the target (and their signaled inner state) is spontaneous (Principle 1): 
targets are not acting according to instruction but are spontaneously reacting, 
sometimes quite subtly, to a worldly event. Second, the truth condition is satisfied in 
that the perceiver’s judgment (and by implication their accuracy in mindreading) can 
be compared against an objective fact (Principle 2). Third, the judgments made by 
perceivers lend themselves to coding using either signal detection or Wagner’s 
unbiased hit rate, codings which quantify response bias and which duly separate 
accuracy from bias (Principle 3). This approach embraces the idea that mindreading is 
adaptive by, amongst other useful things, enabling people to know the world through 
the lens of other minds.
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Footnotes
1. Hypothetically, suppose the target declared something that is not their true 
mental state; how, then, could we explain cases where the perceiver estimates 
the target holds such a mental state that actually corresponds with the target’s 
declaration? In this kind of task, the target watches a video of their own 
behavior and rates their mental state at any given time while watching. If their 
mind were not transparent to itself, then presumably they would effectively 
view themselves as if viewing a third party and infer mental states from clues 
in (their own) observable behavior. This is precisely what perceivers are asked 
to do and therefore it is hardly surprising to find that the kind of judgments 
perceivers make on observing the target coincide with the declarations made 
by the target. Hence, perceiver success in this task does not qualify as 
evidence that the truth condition has been satisfied.
2. The trouble, though, is we are left with the lingering doubt that when the 
perceiver retrodictively inferred that the target’s reaction was caused by Event 
X, they made a direct link between target behavior and the external causal 
event without giving any consideration to the target’s inner states. We will 
return to this problem subsequently and suggest that the experimental 
procedure lends itself to using the tools of cognitive neuroscience to illuminate 
whether or not perceivers are indeed sensing targets’ inner states.
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Figure legends
Figure 1. Three different models of how perceivers might infer the cause (an event in 
the world) of a target’s reaction. Figure 1a depicts a causal chain in which the 
perceiver sesnes the target’s mental state from their reaction (Step 1) and then infers 
the event that caused the mental state (Step 2). Figure 1b depicts the perceiver sensing 
the target mental state and the event in the world that caused the target’s reaction, but 
inferring one (the event in the world) is not dependent on the other (sensing the 
mental state). Figure 1c depicts the perceiver inferring the event in the world that 
caused the target’s reaction without sensing the target's mental state at all.
Page 36 of 37
Social and Personality Psychology Compass































































Page 37 of 37
Social and Personality Psychology Compass
Social and Personality Psychology Compass
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
